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Available online xxxxPublic procurement is increasingly seen as an important potential instrument of innovation
policy. However, policy design has been underpinned largely by anecdotal evidence and
without a clear theoretical or empirical basis for understanding how supplying to the public
sector actually influences a firm's innovation capabilities and performance and in what ways
desirable behaviour and outcomes can be promoted. This paper seeks to address the basis of
innovation procurement policy. It establishes a broad taxonomy of procurement policies and
instruments that have emerged in OECD countries in response to perceived deficiencies and
then compares these with the perceptions of firms using an analysis of a dedicated survey of
800 public sector suppliers in the UK.
It is observed that policy measures include the creation of framework conditions, establishing
organisational frameworks and developing capabilities, identifying, specifying and signalling
needs, and incentivising innovative solutions. The survey findings confirm that the barriers
encountered by firms correspond to the deficiencies addressed by policies but do not address
them sufficiently. This arises from lack of coverage, lack of ownership by purchasers, failure to
address the whole cycle of acquisition and to address risk aversion. The scope of policy
measures needs to be extended in time, breadth of reach and depth.





Public procurement accounts for a significant proportion
of overall demand for goods and services and is increasingly
seen as an attractive and feasible instrument for furthering
the goals of innovation policy [1]. While the interest in the
use of procurement as an industrial and technology policy
instrument or tool is not new [see [2,3]] there has been a
renewed focus on this underexploited ‘demand side’ approachterms of the Creative
Works License, which
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(2013), http://dx.doi.orin recent years [4,5]. Policy aspirations in relation to the use
of public procurement in support of innovation have been
backed by the recommendations of a number of inquiries,
reports and policy documents, both at EU [e.g. [6–8]] and at
national levels [e.g. [9]], most notably in the UK [e.g. [10,11]].
Some of those exclusively targeted public procurement to
push innovation [6,8,9], while others had a broader remit
and situated public procurement within the overall policy
toolbox, often as cornerstone of LeadMarket Strategies [12–14].
However, despite this policy interest, there is little empirical
evidence on the implementation of such policy aspirations and
on whether policy measures reflect the principal difficulties
faced by firms seeking to innovate in the context of the
procurement process.
Moreover, the use of public procurement as an instrument
of innovation policy has posed fresh challenges to policymakers.
Most had their experiences founded in a universe of supply-side
policies which typically sought to address deficiencies in therights reserved.
for public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
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1 We exclude defence procurement from our analysis as it is operates
under a different regulatory framework.
2 L. Georghiou et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxxresources or capabilities available to potential innovating firms.
Resource issues remain the dominant mode, focussed heavily
on the upstreampart of the innovation process and in particular
upon the supply of knowledge. More traditional policies then
give grants, soft loans or fiscal incentives to firms to develop
new technologies underpinned by Arrow/Nelson market failure
arguments about social returns exceeding private returns. Grants
at least may also address information failures and issues of
uncertainty by encouraging firms to pursue longer term R&D
or specific new technologies that they might be averse to
exploring with their own resources. On top of this, the same
instruments can be used to promote behavioural changes by
incentivising collaboration with knowledge producing organisa-
tions or with other firms. For smaller firms, where capability
gaps may be greater, perceived behavioural deficiencies are
also addressed by measures designed to improve their capabil-
ities in management of innovation. With the advent of open
innovation policies to improve the supply of knowledge by
making intellectual property or public data more available are
becoming increasingly common. Taking this whole package
together, what can be said is that almost the whole edifice of
innovation policy has been built upon enhancing the supply of
knowledge to the firm in one way or another. Not surprisingly,
this has meant that innovation policy is often treated as a
branch of technology policy and in governance terms generally
rests with ministries and agencies responsible for R&D policy.
Aswe shall discuss later, thismay have influenced the selection
and prioritisation of policies.
While today it is widely understood that innovation is
an interactive rather than a linear process and that both
technology (or knowledge) push and market pull have a role,
thepredominance or traditionalmarket failure rationales rooted
in neoclassical economics have dissuaded governments from
intervening in so-called near-market stages where customers
interact with suppliers. There are of course attractive arguments
for this position— in a static situation customers should be best
aware of their needs and competition to satisfy those needs
should drive towards the best solution. System failure rationales
have been less inhibited in relation to which parts of the
innovation process they act upon but at their essence is an
emphasis upon linkages and institutions and hence a focus on
policies to improve networking and information flows. Both
sets of rationales can be marshalled in support of the use of
procurement for innovation [see [4]] but in their current
articulations they do not offer explicit guidance for the
design and selection of demand-side policies and in particular
procurement-related interventions. As we will see remedying
gaps in resources and capabilities remain an important part of
the picture. But the crux of demand side interventions is, first,
to increase the incentives for firms to innovate, that is to make
the return to the innovating organisation sufficiently large or
more certain such that it is motivated to supply the innovation;
and second, to make buyers more willing and able to demand
and absorb innovation. To deconstruct demand-side poli-
cies we first need to understand what is going on in public
procurement. While this area has increased in profile in
policy debates for good reasons and is the most prominent
of demand-side measures [5,15], the impression is that policy
measures at present lack a systematic basis for their design. It is
therefore important at this stage tomake sense of the variety of
approaches already adopted and to relate them to a frameworkPlease cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orthat goes beyond themerely simplistic. In so doingwewill also
argue that success in innovation procurement requires a
shared vision of the future between purchasers and suppliers
and that systematic ways of identifying and characterising
those possible futures are an important means to achieve this.
This article investigates the range of policy interventions
to support the use of procurement for innovation and
assesses the degree to which they correspond to corrections
of identified deficiencies in the process. We do this from two
directions. In the first part of the paper we review the policy
framework logic for current policy (Section 2.1) and the
current policy measures as well as the deficiencies they are
intended to remedy (Section 2.2). By doing so we develop a
taxonomy of innovation procurement policy. In the second
part we test the current assumptions about these deficiencies
by analysing relevant aspects of 800 responses to a survey of
firms supplying the UK government (Section 3). In the third
part, we then compare the two to draw conclusions on
whether the design and balance of measures is appropriate to
support the development of this approach as integral part of
a modern innovation policy (Section 4).2. Remedying deficiencies — a policy taxonomy for
innovation procurement
2.1. The policy framework logic
The use of public procurement as innovation policy tool
must accommodate the raison d'être of procurement, which is
that a public organisation purchases goods or services that it
needs to perform its function. Such purchases occur in a wide
range of sectors but construction, health and transport are
all domains where public buying is prominent (in addition
of course to the special case of defence and security1). The
fundamental innovation-related activity comes when a
public purchaser, in making its choice of what to buy, either
seeks to trigger innovation by demanding goods or services
that do yet exist, or responds to it by favouring goods or
services which have innovative characteristics. No matter
what policy goals are formulated, to design public procurement
as an innovation policy tool still means that it is necessary to
improve the cost–benefit of a public organisation performing
its function.
We build our analysis of public procurement of innovation
around a functional approach to procurement, which can track
the sequence of events involved (often called the procurement
cycle) but is not identical to it. We plot the various policy
instruments designed for public procurement of innovation
against the various functions they seek to support and the
deficiencies they seek to remedy.
We take as the startingpointwhatmight be described as the
framework conditions for procurement, including the legislative
background, and the broader governance that determines, for
example, the degree of centralisation, autonomy or devolution
that applies in public bodies for particular types or sizes of
purchase. The framework conditions thus determine thefor public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
g/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.018
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implement procurement activities. This includes the way
in which public bodies engage with the market, and can
pursue additional goals such as, for example, improving access
for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which can
broaden the range of competition for contracts. SME access is
generally thought to be inhibited by a lack of transparency and/
or simplicity in access conditions [16].
Moving towards the specifics, but still in framing mode, we
encounter a package of specific procurement policies, personnel
and practices that could exist in a public organisation. For
example is there an explicit procurement plan or set of
guidelines that favours innovation? Is there a specialised
function?What forms of strategic intelligence exist to keep the
organisation up to date with the latest technological or service
developments and their possibilities?
The next level then concerns instruments and practices
around individual purchasing decisions. On that level we can
organise the discussion around the procurement cycle. We
first consider the case of a procurement that triggers an
innovation that is needed to fulfil a certain need. The process
starts with an identification of a concrete need. This is often
referred to as the commissioning phase and will be in the
hands of the users and budget holders in the organisation
rather thanprocurement officials though the lattermay provide
advice. Sometimes the identification of need is constrained
by lack of knowledge of the potential of innovation. In these
circumstances pre-commercial procurement, that is the pro-
curement of an R&D project to develop and demonstrate the
innovation, can assist the definition of need and the design of a
solution. Thismay then be followed by ‘regular’ procurement of
goods and services.
In any event the more formal (and regulated) procurement
activity begins with pre-qualification of potential contractors,
articulation of requirements into a formal tender, design of
selection procedures and criteria and in due course their
application in an evaluation and selection process. During these
phases under current legislation, several practices are consid-
ered to favour innovation. These include undertaking foresight
activities to make purchasers and suppliers aware of options
beyond their current market relationships and perceptions,
technical dialogue between purchasers and suppliers, writing
specifications in functional terms (i.e. setting a performance
requirement rather than specifying the route by which it
should be achieved), allowing variants to the specification to be
considered, and evaluating on the basis of whole-life costs
rather than the cheapest bid.
The cycle continues with the issuance and monitoring
of the contract and eventual evaluation during all of which
awareness of the innovation dimension can be enhanced. The
procurement cycle approach may also obscure the fact that
innovations can take place through combinations of contracts.
In the case of a combination it may be that the innovative
‘architectural’ step is being taken by the user who is creating a
new configuration of the purchased elements with or without
the explicit involvement of the suppliers. For example a new
web-based service may be established by the user but could
rely on the purchase of higher-performing IT systems. In many
cases public service innovations move in incremental steps.
Where such a sequence is operating innovation may involve
keeping contractors engaged from one phase to another butPlease cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orwhere it is necessary to bring in new contractors theremay be a
need to transfer the relevant knowledge acquired during
earlier stages to the newcomers.
The cycle may also extend in a different way. While the
above steps are focussed on triggering innovation, public
procurement can also incentivise innovation by being respon-
sive to innovation through purchase of recent but recognised
innovations that are new to the organisation. Since most
products and services are not stable but go through a cycle of
post-innovation improvements there are important interac-
tions with users at the diffusion stage [17]. These in turn can
inform the next cycle.
By walking through these levels and stages it is possible
now to consider where failures that hinder innovation to be
triggered or diffused properly may occur, or where good
practice could be extended. By this means we can build a
taxonomy of possible policy interventions. As noted above,
we take the issue of deficiencies in two steps — first by
making explicit those that are being addressed by present
policies and instruments across a range of countries and
second through consideration of deficiencies identified by
suppliers to the UK government, drawing upon the results of
a large-scale survey.
2.2. Foundations of current policies for innovation public
procurement
Following the stylised cycle we have described above, we
can group policy interventions under four main headings,
summarised in Table 1 along with the principal deficiencies
they address.
2.3. Adjusting framework conditions: allowing for innovation
friendly procurement practice
The first area of potential policy action comes in making
framework conditions more conducive to innovation. The legal
framework itself is ultimately restricted by the World Trade
Organisation Government Procurement Agreement which in
Europe is embodied in the European Commission's Directives
on Procurement. The tension in such regulation is between
stimulating competition through innovation on the one hand
and using innovation as a cover for preferential treatment for
‘national champions’ or other means of suppressing competi-
tion to favour local suppliers and hence departing from the
basic principles of transparency, non-discrimination and equal
treatment on the other hand. This tension recently came to
a head in China's decision to suspend certain procurement
measures after protests on behalf of foreign suppliers [18]. In
2005 the European directives were modified with one aim
being to make themmore conducive to innovation by allowing
explicitly, for example, functional specifications, technical
dialogue and transfer of intellectual property to suppliers.
New proposals for modernising the directives published at
the end of 2011 by the EC for the first time make fostering
innovation an explicit objective and introduce:
“… the innovation partnership, a new special procedure
for the development and subsequent purchase of new,
innovative products, works and services, provided they
can be delivered to agreed performance levels and costs. Infor public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
g/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.018
Table 1
Policy measures in support of innovation public procurement.
Policy category Deficiencies addressed Instrument types Examples
Framework
conditions
i) Procurement regulations driv-
en by competition logic at the
expense of innovation logic.
ii) Requirements for public ten-
ders unfavourable to SMEs
i) Introduction of innovation-friendly
regulations
ii) Simplification & easier access for
tender procedures
i) 2005 change in EU Directives including func-
tional specifications, negotiated procedure etc.
ii) 2011 proposal in EU to introduce innovation
partnerships
iii) Paperless procedures, electronic portals, tar-
gets for SME share
Organisation &
capabilities
i) Lack of awareness of innovation
potential or innovation strategy
in organisation
ii) Procurers lack skills in
innovation-friendly procedures
i) High level strategies to embed inno-
vation procurement
ii) Training schemes, guidelines, good
practice networks
iii) Subsidy for additional costs of inno-
vation procurement
i) UK ministries Innovation Procurement
Plans 2009–10
ii) Netherlands PIANOo support network, EC
Lead Market Initiative networks of contracting
authorities






i) Lack of communication be-
tween end users, commission-
ing & procurement function
ii) Lack of knowledge & organised
discourse about wider possibil-
ities of supplier's innovation
potential
i) Pre-commercial procurement of R&D
to develop & demonstrate solutions
ii) Innovation platforms to bring sup-
pliers & users together; Foresight &
market study processes; Use of stan-
dards & certification of innovations
i) SBIR (USA, NL & Australia), SBRI (UK), PCP
EC & Flanders
ii) Innovation Partnerships & Lead Market
Initiative (EC), Innovation Platforms (UK,





i) Risk of lack of take up of
suppliers innovations
ii) Risk aversion by procurers
i) Calls for tender requiring innovation;
Guaranteed purchase or certification
of innovation; Guaranteed price/tar-
iff or price premium for innovation
ii) Insurance guarantees
i) German law enabling innovation demands
in tenders; UK Forward Commitment Pro-
curement; China innovation catalogues (to
2011); Renewable energy premium tariffs
(DE and DK)
Immunity & certification scheme (Korea)
2 See http://www.comite-richelieu.org/.
4 L. Georghiou et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxxaddition, the proposal improves and simplifies the compet-
itive dialogue procedure and facilitates cross-border joint
procurement which is an important instrument for inno-
vative purchasing.”
[[[19], p. 10 and Art. 29]]
The long term partnership which the new procedure is
intended to foster addresses a recognised deficiency in the
previous regime whereby all benefits from innovation effec-
tively had to be realisable in the context of a single purchase
decision when in reality most innovation takes place through a
series of incremental improvements. In this case the partner-
ship is intended to be structured in a sequence of steps from
R&D to supply but allowing exit by the contracting authority at
any stage if so desired.
Despite the existence of directives, even within the EC
there is substantial variation in the framework conditions for
procurement as they affect innovation. For example, under
Belgian Law (Art.78) those who work on the prototype for a
public purchaser are excluded from bidding to supply that
purchaser with the resulting innovative products. In this
case a pro-innovation policy measure would be the removal
of this article from the Law — a course which has been
recommended by two international reviews [[20], also see
[21]]. The application of the procedures introduced in the
directives also varies widely across different EU countries. A
case in point is the uneven use of Competitive Dialogue, with
80% of the total procurements using competitive dialogue in
Europe taking place in the UK and France [22,23].
A different tension in framework conditions concerns
access of SMEs to public procurement. The general political
view is that SMEs get insufficient access to public contracts
and there have been specific lobbies in respect of high techPlease cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orSMEs.2 While this is a wider issue than innovation policy,
there are some important overlaps in that an increase in the
number of potential bidders can drive up competition [24]
and in particular the variety, arguably increasing the potential
for innovation. Some specific policy measures are described
below but at framework level the principal issue is whether
there should be a quota for SMEs. In the United States, a
programme of affirmative action for SME Procurement has
been in place since 1978, when the Public Law 95–507
amended the 1958 Small Business Act so as tomake government
procurementmore accessible to small businesses in the US, with
a “fair proportion” of government procurement spending to
be placed with small (and other disadvantaged) businesses. For
Europe at least the conclusion thus far has been that operation of
a quota would be in violation of European Treaty principles or
the rules that govern fair procurement across the EU [16]. More
specific measures aimed at SMEs are discussed below.2.4. Organisational frameworks and capabilities: supporting the
innovation dimension for the procurement function
In the area of organisational frameworks, two deficiencies
are regularly identified, the first being the broad awareness
and commitment of a public organisation to innovation
procurement and the second the capability of its employees
to execute an innovation procurement strategy. The first of
these was recognised in the UK's previous government'sWhite
Paper Innovation Nation [11] which introduced a requirement
for ministries to have an Innovation Procurement Plan settingfor public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
g/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.018
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ment. The aim was to give ministries “an opportunity to
fundamentally think about their procurement practices and to
consider how these might be improved or used to drive
innovation” [25, p. 3]. A cycle of these plans was produced but
the Government subsequently described them as varying in
quality from strong to ineffective.3 There was no evaluation of
their impact on procurement behaviour but the subsequent
Coalition government decided to discontinue the requirement
for IPPs as part of thewider programmeof reformof government
procurement [26]. However, other countries, such as Austria,
have copied and implemented the idea of regular forward
looking plans of departments that outline the need for and intent
to procuring innovation [27].2.5. Building capacities
The issue of capability is generally agreed to be a key
barrier. Indeed, in the majority of existing public procure-
ment cases that have been analysed the role of enabling
procurers and those who commission procurement has been
the single most important enabler – or barrier – for innovation
procurement4 [[6,28], also see [29]]. Building in the require-
ments of innovation alters both the practice and themindset of
procurers and those they work with.5 This includes several of
the activities discussed in the following section and the use of
novel approaches such as functional specifications (see below)
or of more complex negotiated procedures. Particularly for
countries new to the area the challenge is considerable —
ministries in small European countries identified lack of
sufficient procurement expertise for complex purchases in-
volving innovation as a key barrier for them, especially in the
absence of formal training for the profession [28]. There have
been various guidelines produced to address this issue [30–32].
Other approaches include the best practice groups, training and
the use of learning pilots and demonstrators aiming to spread
best practice. For example, the Dutch PIANOo activity has been
organising meetings, producing publications and working with
groups chaired by experts since 2005.6 The EU's Lead Market
Initiative, an integrated approach to demand-side innovation
policy supported networks of contracting authorities [12]. More
direct cooperation can also be seen as a means of spreading
expertise, for example the use of common documentation in
calls. Centralisation is also a response to capacity issues, where a
concentration of expertise andbudgets is used to compensate for
sub-critical expertise and high learning costs across depart-
ments. Caution needs to be exercised here as economies of scale
and scope can be offset by creating a distance between the
procurement function and the users in the distributed parts of
the public sector and hence the possibility of interaction with
suppliers to foster innovation.3 This is based on interviews of the authors with officials in various UK
departments.
4 For an overview of those studies see: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
gpp/pdf/compilation%20case%20studies.pdf.
5 We focus here on the capabilities during the procurement process, not
the capabilities more broadly that are needed to actually implement an
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could also be manifested in higher costs. Policy initiatives
are seeking to address this by offering financial support to
buyers in order to reduce the overheads of learning to use
innovation-friendly procedures. In one example Tekes, the
Finnish national innovation agency meets the cost of up to
75% of project expenses in the planning stage [9, p. 7–8]. The
European Commission has an experimental scheme under
which financial support of up to 30% of the procurement
cost (with a ceiling) is available for purchasing authorities that
share experience through the specification and publication of
a (joint or coordinated) call for tender involving innovation.7
2.6. Identifying, specifying and signalling needs
At the core of innovation procurement policy that seeks to
support the triggering of innovation is the communication of
needs for innovation from buyers to suppliers. This step
requires that the needs have been identified and articulated
in a way that can form the subject of a procurement process.
As noted in the previous section user requirements can be
encapsulated in a functional specification which allows the
need to be described and communicated without prescribing
the solution and hence creating scope for innovation.
Several types of policy initiatives have sought to reinforce
this step. The failure such measures address is an inadequate
identification and translation of needs into specification,
resulting frequently into a specification too narrowly defined
and in terms of characteristics that can be easily measured
and monitored and reduced to price rather than innovative
features. The articulation of future needs can be at multiple
levels, for example both for the public agency (internal use)
and for the citizens.8 In some terminologies a distinction is
made between “commissioning” — the process by which the
user identifies and expresses the need and “procurement” in
which normally a professional agent carries out the formal
process of drawing up a specification and awarding a contract
to the chosen supplier. There is as much a need for good
communication in these internal channels as there is between
purchaser and supplier.
One means of longer term oriented articulation which has
become part of the content of the capability agenda discussed
above as a key element of good practice is the use of foresight
and other long term approaches to get future intelligence about
demand and supply. Technology roadmaps give a greater sense
of security to those committing resources to an innovative
approach and at the same time indicate wider options to
buyers [33]. While this is a feature of good practice rather than
a policy initiative as such, foresight and road-mapping are
sometimes embedded in initiatives that aim to bridge supply
and demand such as technology or innovation platforms [for
example, 21]. Another kind of platform exists within lead
market approaches [12]. Forward-looking approaches may
be labelled as market consultation. For example, in a project
within the lead market initiative using the UK government
Forward Commitment approaches (see below), a health7 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/lead-market-
initiative/pp-conf2_en.htm.
8 An example of the engagement of citizens is the Danish Mind-lab (TC
2011,22).
for public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
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lighting. The unmet need was put into a procurement call,
without prescribing any solution, at least two years before
the lighting was needed. A market sounding process was used
to engage the supply chain and to stimulate cross-sector
cooperation. According to the authority, “The market consulta-
tion process was enthusiastically received and culminated in a
consultation workshop and a refined outcome based specifica-
tion” [34].
The largest scale initiatives at this stage of the cycle are in
the domain of pre-commercial procurement (PCP). Initiatives
in this domain support the development of prototypes by
financing the underlying R&D as a starting point for general
procurement. The archetypal initiative in this category is
the US Small Business Innovation Research Program which
reserves a proportion of the extramural research budgets of
Federal Agencies for contracts and grants to small businesses
[35]. Versions of the scheme exist in the UK, the Netherlands,
Australia and Belgium (Flanders) [8]. PCP is also used and
promoted by the European Commission which was respon-
sible for coining the term [36]. PCP in general does not come
under procurement law as it concerns R&D support and is
regulated principally under State Aid provisions. All are
concerned with triggering demand and facilitate a definition
of a requirement for a solution that is not there in the market.
They tackle a range of deficiencies including information
asymmetries, lack of interaction between buyer and potential
suppliers, perceived exclusion of small companies (e.g. design
companies) from access to government contracts, and risk
aversion on both the public and private sides.
Possibly the most formalised system for signalling demand
was operated by the Chinese government (as part of its
Indigenous Innovation Policy) from 2006 until 2011, when it
was suspended in response to concerns about the use of the
approach to discriminate against foreign firms. Under this
system ‘catalogues’ were used to accredit the supply and
demand of technologically oriented products. Two major types
of catalogues existed, ‘catalogues of indigenous innovation
products’ (innovation catalogues) and ‘guiding catalogues
of key technology equipment for indigenous innovation’
(equipment catalogues). Technologies listed in the equip-
ment catalogues represented the needs of ministries and had
priority for research and development assistance and other
support (triggering innovation). The innovation catalogue
(which was eventually only used at provincial level) was by
contrast a collection of products “accredited” as being innova-
tive and indigenous (in terms of IP ownership) [18] and hence
used for procurement responding to innovation.2.7. Incentivising innovative solutions
A commonly identified deficiency is the risk involved in
adopting innovative solutions. There is substantial comment
about public sector buyers being more risk averse than the
private sector because benefits take longer to be realised
than the typical political cycle. National audit bodies are also
considered far more likely to criticise what they see as
excessive risk-taking than any insufficiency. We explore
whether there is in reality evidence to support this view in
the next section but nonetheless several policies exist whichPlease cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orhave been designed either to incentivise innovation or to
offset risks of various kinds.
From the supplier perspective the biggest risk is that the
purchaser will not respond to their offering of an innovative
solution. The most straightforward signal is a clear require-
ment for innovation within the tender document. The German
government has legislated to enable commissioning bodies to
impose additional demands upon suppliers, including asking
for innovative solutions [37, p. 16]. A much more targeted
approach is the UK's Forward Commitment Procurement
initiative which makes the market aware of needs and
requirements and commits to buy solutions that meet these
needs at a price commensurate with their benefits [38].
A range of approaches has been proposed for the manage-
ment of risk in public procurement of innovation [39]. One
approach used in practice is through providing a financial
cushion. For example, financial incentives have been targeted
at reducing the perceived risk of procuring from innovative
SMEs. The French government enacted legislation which
offered a price premium by means of which buyers could
give preferential treatment to innovative SMEswhen purchasing
high tech goods, R&D or studies [40, p. 14]. Another approach to
the mitigation of risk is the provision of insurance guarantees,
this time aimed at reducing risk to buyers, the South Korean
government's New Technology Purchasing Assurance Scheme.
This grants immunity to buyers for losses incurred due to the
procurement of products covered by performance insurance.
SMEs are able to get the performance of their products certified
and can then benefit from the government providing price and
purchasing assurance [5, p. 154].
Finally, the use of standards and certificates (such as quality
labels) to reduce uncertainty is part of some procurement
supporting schemes. One example here is the NHS in England
that uses intermediary organisations to establish demonstration
procurement procedures (National TechnologyAdoption Centre,
NTAC) or quality certificates and business cases (National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, NICE) in order to
reduce transaction costs and risks for the NHS trusts and
hospitals [41].
3. Deficiencies from the supplier perspective
Above we have discussed the policy instruments against
the deficiencies they seek to overcome. Those policies are
based on perceptions of policy makers as to what they think
the deficiencies are. Moreover, most of the evidence that has
underpinned the policy debate in recent years and that has
shaped the perceptions of policy makers has been based on
case studies. The bulk of those studies have focussed on the
demand side itself, on the public organisation that procures
and the interaction during the procurement cycle [see [6,28]].
However, to assess how the policy portfolio fits the needs
of all stakeholders involved, it is indispensible to understand
which obstacles suppliers find most problematic when it
comes to selling innovations to public organisations. To
understand the suppliers, we have conducted a survey of
suppliers to public sector organisations in the UK.
The focus of the survey was to understand the elements
that act as barriers and drivers to stimulating innovation in
the procurement process. The survey asked for information





Size (no. of employees) Less than 10 82 10.3
Between 10 and 49 297 37.1
Between 50 and 250 226 28.2
More than 250 190 23.8
Main categories of goods
and services supplied
Facilities & management services 91 11.4
Healthcare equipment, supplies and services (inc. dental & optical) 116 14.5
Office equipment & stationery, computers & telecoms 61 7.6
Professional services 159 19.9
Social community care, supplies & services 133 16.6
Works 145 18.1
Main client Local government 191 23.9
NHS 421 52.6
Central government 137 17.1
Type of organisation Private 649 81
Social enterprise 139 17
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engaged in, as well as general perception on the main practices
and competences of procuring organisations, including per-
ceived barriers to innovation.
In order to identify a sampling frame of organisations
supplying to the UK government, we used information on
public sector contracting during 2010 for the National Health
Service, Central Government and Local Government in
England.9 Overall we identified 8130 public sector suppliers.10
The survey was conducted using CATI (Computer Aided
Telephone Interviewing) by Harris Interactive, a UK survey
company and took place between May and July, 2011. By July
2011 800 full interviews had been conducted, which represent
approximately 10% of the total sample. Our respondents were
either general managers or heads of public sector contracts.
Table 2 gives details of the respondents. It is important to
note that the vast majority of organisations in the sample is
innovative, 94% indicating that they have had an innovation
(new or improved product, service and/or process) within the
last 3 years. More specifically 54% have introduced a product
innovation, 75% a service innovation and 67% a process
innovation. Given the composition of suppliers in the sample
in terms of the mix of goods and services and the areas of
government that they serve, it is not surprising thatmost of the
innovation among government suppliers is related to services.
As innovative suppliers to public bodies the sample is
therefore highly relevant to comment on obstacles and
deficiencies.
The starting point for our considerations is a broad finding
that the lack of demand from the market is the single most
important obstacle for innovation, as most recently demon-
strated with a Gallup survey for Eurobarometer 2011 [[42,9 Entries for local government suppliers correspond to 93 Local authorities
in England. This is around a third of local authorities in England. Data for
central government covers 97 department entities belonging to 25 central
government departments. Data for NHS trusts covers spend for the 5 (South
east, East of England, East Midlands, NorthWest, Yorks and Humber) of the 9
English NHS regions.
10 Public procurement (particularly in local government) is characterised by a
concentration of a high proportion of spend by relatively few firms, while there is
a fairly long “tail” in the distribution of businesses that have quite small contracts
by value Peck and Cabras [44]. In order to deal with this, we only targeted ‘core’
suppliers, namely organisations whose aggregated annual contracting with the
public sectorwas above a certain threshold (of £50,000) in the 2010financial year.
Please cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orp. 31,43]]. Our survey zooms into the public share of demand.
First, it shows that public procurement does indeed lead to
innovation. Out of the 94% innovative organisations in the
responding sample, 67% indicate that bidding for or delivering
contracts to public sector clients has had some impact on their
innovation activity: 25% of the innovating organisations claim
that all of their innovations have been the result of public
procurement. Furthermore, 56% of the sample reported that
they won a public sector contract in the last three years
because of innovation.
In addition, 51.4% of suppliers in the sample that carried
out R&D11 in the last three years admitted having increased
their R&D expenses as a result of delivering or bidding for
public sector contracts. Crucially, public buyers are the
second most important source for innovation in our survey
(right after changes in the market, but more important
than internal R&D or private buyers), which again is consis-
tent with the Eurobarometer data for all Europe [42, p. 43]. As
well as becoming more innovative, organisations experienced
further positive knock on effects: more than three-quarters of
organisations who innovated in the context of bidding or
delivering goods or services to public bodies in England in the
last three years report that the innovation has helped them to
win other public sector contracts, more than half increased
sales in the private sector and a smaller share of 29% report
increased or enabled overseas sales.
Given this potential, it is even more important to
understand what obstacles suppliers see and how the policy
instruments designed and implemented fit to overcome
them. One major obstacle is the general lack to signal the
readiness and willingness to buy an innovation. A strong
indication is delivered by the comparison to private costumers.
Suppliers that responded to the survey and who sell to public
and private customers roughly in equalmeasure – and thus can
best compare – assess public buyers to be less innovation friendly
than private customers, i.e. to be less open to new ideas, less
well placed to buy an innovation, and less likely to demand
innovation in the first place (Fig. 1).11 In our survey, R&D refers to any activities undertaken to increase
knowledge for innovation. Examples include making prototypes, testing of
a new design, developing new software or IT tools, conducting market
research.






















0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Public sector customers are more open to new 
ideas compared to our private sector customers
Public sector customers are more likely to 
demand an innovative solution compared with 
our private customers
Public sector customers are better placed to buy 
innovation compared with our private sector 
customers
Public sector customers are more reluctant to 
take risks compared with our private customers
Strongly agree Agree Neither agree nor disagree Disagree Strongly disagree
Fig. 1. Assessment of public vs. private customers.
Source: Underpinn survey.
Note: Responses are only applicable to those firms and organisations that supply both to the public and private sector therefore excludes those who largely or
solely serve the public sector market (N varies between 194 and 200).
8 L. Georghiou et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxxA first bundle of reasons for this are to be found in the
attitudes and knowledge of procurers as perceived by suppliers. A
large proportion of respondents (strongly) dispute that public
suppliers are willing to take risk (indicating the prohibitive
incentive structures for procurers to do so), while half of the
responding sample question the technical and market knowl-
edge of procurers (Fig. 2).
Secondly, barriers lie in the way public procurement is
organised and the principleswithwhich it is conducted (Fig. 3).
Overwhelmingly, it is the emphasis on price rather than quality
that firms complain most about; 60% of those answering the
question see this as a very significant barrier to innovation. A
related bundle of barriers has to do with restraining variety:
the disallowance of variants and too prescriptive specifications
hinder innovation, as does the lack of openness to unsolicited
ideas which a majority of respondents report as well. Further,
suppliers see a lack of interaction with the procuring body as a
key hurdle to innovation. This is true despite the fact that our
sample is characterised by often very long lasting relationships.





Public procurers are knowledgeable about the market in which our 
product and/or service operates
Public procurers are able to make effective use of the whole supply 
chain to achieve value for money and innovation
Public procurers are knowledgeable about the technical aspects of our 
product and/or service
Public procurers are willing to take risks involved with purchasing 
innovative products and/or services
Strongly disagree Disagree Neither agre
Fig. 2. Assessment of proc
Source: Underpinn survey
Please cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orthemselves do not support innovation activity, but rather that
it is fostered by accompanying interaction and communication
of needs. It is in this interaction space that the common vision
of the future plays a role. Finally, the procurement process
is also assessed to be overly complex and lacking useful
feedback, both potential hindrances for innovative compa-
nies. These latter barriers are felt particularly strongly by
small and particularly microenterprises.
Thirdly, this is mirrored in the actual procurement practices
that suppliers value most. The respondents were asked to
indicate how often they experience ‘innovation friendly’ pro-
curement practices such as early engagement, interaction with
procurers, innovation requirements in tenders and IPR manage-
ment, andwhich of those practices has contributed to innovation
in the past. The result is striking: those public procurement
practices that appear to be most strongly associated with
innovation (innovation requirements in tenders, early interac-
tion with procurers, outcome based specifications, advanced
communication of needs) are also some of the least frequently
















30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
e nor disagree Agree Strongly agree
urer characteristics.
(N varies between 762 and 791)









































0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Contracts too long 
Inadequate management of IPR
Contracts too large 
Contracts not large enough 
General lack of demand for innovation
Contracts not long enough
Poor management of risk
Low capabilities of procurers
Specifications too prescriptive
Risk aversion of public procurers
Variants not allowed
Lack of interaction with procuring body
Too much emphasis on price
Very significant Moderately significant Not at all significant
Fig. 3. Significance of barriers.
Source: Underpinn survey (N varies between 610 and 764)
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innovation activities in around two thirds of respondents, these
practices were only frequently experienced by a third or
fewer of respondents.
At a generic level there is a good correspondence between
the barriers perceived by suppliers and the main categories of
the deficiencies identified as needing to be addressed in the
four-part policy taxonomy developed in Section 2.2:
■ The perception by suppliers that the procurement process is
unduly complicated and lacks useful feedback is evidenced
in Fig. 3, which indicates lack of interaction as being6%





Incentive contracts such as profit-sharing..
Competitive dialogue
Full life-cycle costing considerations
Emphasis on sustainability criteria
Advanced communication of future needs
Outcome-based specifications
Early interaction with procuring organisation
Innovation requirements in tenders
Encouraged innovation if experienced (%)
Fig. 4. Assessment of the innovation impact of procurement practices and percenta
Source: Underpinn survey.
Please cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orsecond only to price as a barrier (79.2% of respondents
seeing as significant). This is an issue with respect to
framework conditions;
■ Finding public buyers less innovation friendly than private
customers and less likely to demand innovation is a strong
result from the organisations with only 17.1% agreeing that
public customers are more likely to demand an innovation
than private ones (Fig. 1) and 71.0% perceiving low capabil-
ities for innovation amongprocurers (Fig. 3). This clearlymaps
to policies dealing with organisation and capabilities;
■ The strong association of innovation with advance


























ge of all respondents experiencing that practice frequently.
for public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
g/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.018
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highlighted in Fig. 4 which puts these clearly at the top for
the firms (also agreeingwith the result on lack of interaction
noted above from Fig. 3). This links clearly to the group of
policies concerned with identification, specification and
signalling of needs; and
■ The attribution of risk aversion to prohibitive incentive
structures is explicitly supported by the response shown in
Fig. 1 where 64.7% of respondents in a position to compare
with private customers see public buyers as beingmore risk
averse and Fig. 2 in which 72.7% of the respondents
disagree with the proposition that public buyers are willing
to take risks in purchasing innovative products or services.
This corresponds to the group of policies that incentivise
innovative solutions.
Thus we may conclude that, at a first level, there is a good
consistency between the deficiencies identified by policymakers
as a basis for the design of policy measures and the barriers and
success factors indicated by the supplier organisations.
4. Conclusions: limitations of the current portfolio of policies
While public procurement is increasingly seen as an
important potential instrument of innovation policy, evidence
of its effectiveness is largely anecdotal. This paper first
provided a taxonomyof procurement policies and instruments.
It then reviewed a range of policy instruments according to the
failures they address and compared these with the actual
perceptions of suppliers to the public sector. The latter drew
upon a dedicated survey of 800 suppliers (private and third
sector) to the UK public sector.
As noted above policy instruments appear to be targeted
towards the main deficiencies experienced by firms. The
question which then follows is why in the face of these policy
interventions, firms appear still to encounter the difficulties
that the interventions aim to address? To conclude the paper
we offer a series of propositions and observations that may
explain the persistence of the deficiencies:
i. The presence of policies does not mean that they are
consistently available. Examples are scattered in different
countries, and many remain, if not at the proposal stage,
experiments or pilots with limited coverage, roll out or
budgets;
ii. Policies are not always well rooted in governance terms.
They are often owned byministries or agencies responsible
for innovation policy while successful implementation
depends on budget holders in health, transport etc. and
often may be at sub-national level. These actors do not
necessarily have the same commitment or understanding
of innovation, which creates a much bigger challenge to
secure the diffusion of the policy.
iii. A further concern is that, despite the benefits that success
would yield, austerity budgets and cutbacks in government
have halted some measures (for example innovation
procurement plans in the UK). There is also discussion in
some quarters of turning back the clock to favour national
suppliers over innovative ones;
iv. Policy instruments mainly address the act of procurement
itself and do not engage with the whole cycle from
identification of need to adoption and diffusion of thePlease cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.orinnovation, even though many barriers exist at those stage
and generally involve a wider set of actors and stake-
holders;
v. Although some measures exist to mitigate risk, none
address it as a broader cultural problem within the
public sector or seek to change wider governance such as
audit frameworks to achieve a shift in the risk/reward
ratios.
To harness the huge power of procurement budgets in the
direction of innovation thus requires a systemic approach to
policy and its implementation. Three key dimensions need to
be addressed, cutting across the policy taxonomy. These
extend the scope of policy to be longer, wider and deeper:
■ Extension of the timeframe so that the whole cycle of
need and its satisfaction is addressed, also ensuring that a
future vision is built-in;
■ Extension of the breadth of reach of policy to include all
stakeholders and to overcome deficiencies in the under-
standing of innovation among purchasing ministries
and agencies on the one hand and the understanding
of procurement and its relation to innovation in those
normally dealing with supply-side innovation policies on
the other hand;
■ Deepening the measures to address the underlying
cultural practices of the public sector, particularly in
relation to risk management.
A first step in extending the timeframe is to enhance
communication between all actors in the wider lifecycle
of purchasing and enhancing in the context of a forward-
looking vision which brings together anticipated needs and a
wide range of potential solutions. As remarked earlier this is
the natural territory of foresight approaches, including road-
mapping. However, those foresight approaches will need to
adapt to the procurement environment and be designed to
avoid capture by the advocates of particular solutions. Theywill
also need to engage end users beyond the initial purchasers
to ensure that the innovators are given robust feedback at
the earliest possible stage. The payoff will be to improve the
diffusion environment as well as that for innovation, a critical
factor in the public sector where decisions are not wholly
market driven.
To make purchasing ministries take ownership of innova-
tion procurement measures may require not only education
but also a fundamental change in their mission so that
promotion of innovation becomes an additional objective
for all of them across government [45].
The problem of risk aversion and culture is probably the
least tractable as the remedy is unlikely to reside only within
the domain of procurement or even of innovation. To avoid
labelling such issues with a mystique that leaves them in the
domain of the insoluble it is important to unpack them and to
address directly the factors which drive them. Solutions may
include specialised intermediaries who support buying orga-
nisations in complex procurement activities and by doing so
build up capacity and risk management practices across the
public sector. Ultimately support and trainingwould have to be
underpinned by changes in individual incentives and rewards
and a programme of rigorous evaluation designed to test (and
hopefully prove) the proposition that the present practice offor public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
g/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.018
11L. Georghiou et al. / Technological Forecasting & Social Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxxhighlighting only failures when risks are taken fails to capture
the whole picture in which productivity and service gains
through innovation in the public sector increase societalwelfare.
Role of funding source
This work was funded through the UK Economic and Social
Research Council Grant RES-598-25-0037 with contributed
support from theDepartment of Business Innovation and Skills,
NESTA (National Endowment for Science, Technology and the
Arts) and the Technology Strategy Board. The authors would
like to acknowledge their generous support. Beyond normal
peer review input they have no influence on the content of this
paper or the decision to publish. They would also like to thank
the anonymous referees for their helpful guidance.
References
[1] E. Uyarra, K. Flanagan, Understanding the innovation impacts of public
procurement, Eur. Plan. Stud. 18 (2010) 123–143.
[2] P.A. Geroski, Procurement policy as a tool of industrial policy, Int. Rev.
Appl. Econ. 4 (1990) S182–S198.
[3] R. Rothwell, Technology-based small firms and regional innovation
potential: the role of public procurement, J. Public Policy 4 (1984) 307–332.
[4] J. Edler, L. Georghiou, Public procurement and innovation— resurrecting
the demand side, Res. Policy 36 (2007) 949–963.
[5] OECD, Demand Side Innovation Policy, OECD, Paris, 2011.
[6] J. Edler, S. Ruhland, S. Hafner, J. Rigby, L. Georghiou, L. Hommen, M.
Rolfstam, C. Edquist, L. Tsipouri, M. Papadokou, Innovation and Public
Procurement. Review of Issues at Stake, Study for the European
Commission, Final Report, European Commission, Brussels, 2005.
[7] V. Lember, T. Kalvet, R. Kattel, C. Penna, M. Suurna, Public procurement
for innovation in Baltic Metropolises — case studies, Tallinn, http://
www.tallinn.ee/est/g2420s335192007(Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[8] J. Rigby, P. Boekholt, A. Semple, J. Deuten, R. Apostol, S. Corvers, J. Edler,
Final report: feasibility study on future EU support to public procurement




[9] P. Stern, J. Hellman, M. Rijnders-Nagle, M. Terrell, T. Astrom, How public
procurement can stimulate innovative services, http://www.technopolis-
group.com/resources/downloads/nl/2011_Report_Public_Procurement_
NICE.pdf 2011(Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[10] NESTA, Driving Innovation Through Public Procurement, NESTA Policy &
ResearchUnit, London, 2007. (http://www.nesta.org.uk/library/documents/
Driving-innovation-public-procurement-pb.pdf. Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[11] Department for Innovation Universities and Skills (DIUS), Innovation
Nation White Paper, March 2008. CM7345 (London).
[12] European Commission, A Lead Market Initiative for Europe, COM
(2007) 860 Final, Brussels, 2007.
[13] E. Aho, J. Cornu, L. Georghiou, A. Subira, Creating an innovative Europe,
Report of the Independent Expert Group on R&D and Innovation
Appointed Following the Hampton Court Summit, European Commis-
sion, 2006, (EUR22005).
[14] BMBF, Ideas, Innovation. Prosperity. High-Tech Strategy 2020 for
Germany, Berlin, 2010.
[15] K. Izsak, J. Edler, Trends and challenges in demand-side innovation
policies in Europe, Thematic Report 2011 Under Specific Contract for the
Integration of INNO Policy Trendchart with ERAWATCH (2011–2012),
Brussels, 2011.
[16] A. Glover, Accelerating the SME Economic Engine: Through Transparent,
Simple and Strategic Procurement, HM Treasury, London, 2008. (http://
www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr08_economicengine_2390.pdf. Last
accessed 23/06/2012).
[17] L. Georghiou, J.S. Metcalfe, M. Gibbons, T.E. Ray, J. Evans, Post-Innovation
Performance— Technological Development and Competition, MacMillan,
Basingstoke, 1986.
[18] Y. Li, Public Procurement as a Demand-Side Innovation Policy Tool in
China — A National Level Case Study, DRUID Conference, Copenhagen,
Denmark, 2011.
[19] European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council on Public Procurement, COM(2011) 896
Final, Brussels, 2011.Please cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.or[20] J.S. Agejas, K. Husso, A. Mahr, X. Goenaga, P. Vock, 2011 Policy Mix Peer
Review Belgium — Final Report, 2011.
[21] H. Vermeulen, Demand-side innovation policies in Flanders, in:
OECD (Ed.), Demand Side Innovation Policies, OECD, Paris, 2011,
pp. 115–121.
[22] S. Arrowsmith, S. Treumer, Competitive Dialogue in EU Procurement
(forthcoming), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012.
[23] S. Treumer, E. Uyarra, Competitive dialogue and contractual design
fostering innovation and need analysis, in: G. Piga, S. Treumer (Eds.),
The Applied Law and Economics of Public Procurement (forthcoming),
Routledge, London, 2012.
[24] V. Grimm, R. Pacini, G. Spagnolo, M. Zanza, Division into lots and
competition in procurement, in: N. Dimitri, G. Piga, G. Spagnolo (Eds.),
Handbook of Procurement, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
2006, pp. 168–192.
[25] DIUS, Procuring for Innovation, Innovation for Procurement, 2008.
(London).
[26] U.K. Government, Government response to the House of Lords Science
and Technology Committee inquiry into public procurement as a tool
to stimulate innovation, http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/science-technology/publicprocurement/GovermentResponse
August2011.pdf2011(Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[27] E. Buchinger, Public Procurement of Innovation as Part of a Demand-
Side Innovation Policy Mix — Austrian Experiences, Manchester, 2012.
[28] L. Georghiou, Y. Li, E. Uyarra, J. Edler, Public procurement for innovation in
small European countries— final report, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
gpp/pdf/Public%20Procurement%20for%20Innovation%20in%20Small%20
European%20Countries.pdf2010(Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[29] J. Yeow, E. Uyarra, S. Gee, Sustainable innovation through public
procurement: the case of ‘closed loop’ recycled paper, Manchester
Business School Working Paper, Number 615, 2011.
[30] OGC, Policy through procurement, http://www.ogc.gov.uk/policy_and_
standards_framework_policy_through_procurement.asp2010 (Last accessed
23/06/2012).
[31] European Commission, Guide on dealing with innovative solutions in
public procurement — 10 elements of good practice, Commission Staff
Working Document SEC(2007) 280, Brussels, 2007, (www.proinno-
europe.eu/doc/procurement_manuscript.pdf. Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[32] R. Wilkinson, L. Georghiou, J. Cave, Public Procurement for Research
and Innovation, European Commission, DG Research, 2005.
[33] R. Phaal, C.J.P. Farrukh, D.R. Probert, Technology roadmapping — a
planning framework for evolution and revolution, Technol. Forecast.
Soc. Chang. 71 (2004) 5–26.
[34] LCB Healthcare, Case study, Ultra Efficient Lighting for Future Wards:,
The Rotherham NHS Foundation Trust, UK, 2011. http://lowcarbon-
healthcare.eu/cms/resources/uploads/File/4389_Optimat_LCB-Healthcare_
Rotherham_FINAL%2031%20Oct.pdf. Last accessed 04/05/2013.
[35] C. Wessner, An Assessment of the Small Business Innovation Research
Program, Policy and Global Affairs Division, National Research Council
of the National Academies, Washington, 2009.
[36] European Commission, Preliminary Paper on the Community Law
Applicable to Pre-commercial Public Procurement, 2006.
[37] C. Rammer, Mini Country Report/Germany — Thematic Report 2011
Under Specific Contract for the Integration of INNO Policy TrendChart
with ERAWATCH (2011–2012), Brussels, 2011.
[38] BIS, Delivering Best Value Through Innovation — Forward Commit-




[39] L. Tsipouri, J. Edler, M. Rolfstam, E. Uyarra, Risk Management in the
Procurement of Innovation. Concepts and Empirical Evidence in the
European Union, European Commission, Brussels, 2009. (http://ec.
europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/risk_management.pdf.
Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[40] E. Zaparucha, A. Muths, Mini Country Report/France— Thematic Report
2011 Under Specific Contract for the Integration of INNO Policy
TrendChart with ERAWATCH (2011–2012), Brussels, 2011.
[41] J. Yeow, J. Edler, "Innovation Procurement as Projects.", Journal of Public
Procurement 12 (no. 4) (2012) 472–504.
[42] Gallup, Attitudes of European entrepreneurs towards eco-innovation,
Analytical Report, Flash Eurobarometer, 315, 2011, (http://ec.europa.
eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_315_en.pdf. Last accessed 23/06/2012).
[43] Gallup, Innobarameter 2010: analytical report — innovation in
public administrations, Flash Eurobarometer, 3052011. (http://ec.
europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl_305_en.pdf. Last accessed 23/06/
2012).
[44] F. Peck, I. Cabras, The impact of local authority procurement on local
economies the case of Cumbria, North West England, Public Policy
Adm. 26 (3) (July 2011) 307–331.for public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
g/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.018
12 L. Georghiou et al. / Technological Forecasting Social Change xxx (2013) xxx–xxx[45] K. Blind, L. Georghiou, Drivers and impediments for innovation in
Europe, Intereconomics 45 (2010) 264–286.
Luke Georghiou is a Professor of Science and Technology Policy and
Management in theManchester Institute of Innovation Research atManchester
Business School. His research interests are demand-side innovation policy,
foresight and evaluation. He is active in policy advice to governments and
business and in the leadership team of the University of Manchester.
Jakob Edler is a Professor of Innovation Policy and Strategy and Executive
Director of the Manchester Institute of Innovation Research. His research
interests are in science and innovation policy analysis and evaluation, with a
focus on demand based innovation policy.Please cite this article as: L. Georghiou, et al., Policy instruments
assessment, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (2013), http://dx.doi.or&Elvira Uyarra is a Senior Lecturer in the Manchester Institute of Innovation
Research at Manchester Business School. Elvira has over ten years
experience in the field of science and innovation policy and economic
development. Her areas of research interest include the analysis and
evaluation of regional innovation policies, university–industry links, science
and technology policy rationales and demand-side innovation policy.Jillian Yeow is a Research Associate in the Manchester Institute of
Innovation Research at Manchester Business School. Her research focuses
on project-based forms of organisation and virtual work, organisational
innovation and innovation management.for public procurement of innovation: Choice, design and
g/10.1016/j.techfore.2013.09.018
